Essay Read By Constituting America Founder, Actress Janine Turner
Contracts are the promises that are made individually or collectively that are presumed to be legally enforceable. They are normally the product of negotiation and deliberation among parties regarding the mutual obligations that they accept voluntarily. Not every agreement is a contract, and not every promise is legally enforceable, but contracts have become an essential means by which individuals can organize themselves and carry out personal and professional interactions, particularly with persons or entities with whom they have no personal or familial connection. The ability to make contracts, and the capacity and willingness for a neutral arbiter to guarantee that contracts will be enforced, became one of the critical developments that made long-term and long distance trade relations possible. Contracts also became a building block of the modern corporation, which is often described today as a “nexus of contracts.”
The freedom to make contracts and the confidence that contracts will be enforced cannot be taken for granted. Prior to the United States Constitutional Convention of 1787, many of the original thirteen states were actively undermining the enforcement of contracts among citizens. In most cases, the contracts that were threatened by state actions were concerned with debts. State legislatures enacted a number of laws which prevented creditors from collecting debts in the time frame stipulated in contracts. For this reason, many creditors looked to the federal government to curb state actions which threatened the execution of contracts. Congress, under the Articles of Confederation, provided in the Northwest Ordinance that in that soon to be developed territory stipulated “no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory, that shall in any manner whatever interfere with, or affect private contracts or engagements, bona fide and without fraud previously formed.”  Notably the clause pertained only to “private” contracts that were already in existence.
At the Constitutional Convention, a stand-alone contracts clause was debated and ultimately rejected, but the Committee on Style inserted a general form of the clause within a section dealing with limits on state power, which the convention did approve. The final language in Article 1, Section 10, reads as follows: “No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.” The clause is sandwiched between other provisions that limit states’ ability to engage in diplomacy, affect international trade, or carry out monetary policy. There is no language limiting the clause’s application to private contracts, nor is the clause clearly limited to contracts that were “previously formed,” although the courts quickly established that state law could regulate future behavior that might otherwise be the subject of a contract. It should also be noted that the contracts clause does not forbid the federal government from “impairing the obligation of contracts.” In fact, the federal government may modify debt contracts very dramatically through bankruptcy laws, which were authorized explicitly by the bankruptcy clause in Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution.
The clause was applied in some early cases of the Supreme Court. In 1810, the Court ruled in Fletcher v. Peck that the state of Georgia could not revoke a previously issued land grant to private parties. This ruling established that the contract clause applied to both public and private contracts. A few years later, the Court more clearly asserted the constitutional protection of contracting in the case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward. In this ruling, the Court held that a charter establishing and organizing a private academic institution could not be fundamentally changed by an enactment of the New Hampshire legislature. This decision was not only significant because it defended the right of private parties to have their contracts respected, but also because it recognized that private associations and incorporated entities could be at least somewhat insulated from state government control.
In later cases, the Court made clear that the right to engage in personal contracts is not absolute. In Ogden v. Saunders, the Court ruled that the states could make laws affecting contracts as long as those laws had prospective effect. Later, in Stone v. Mississippi, the justices ruled that the contract clause did not prevent states from exercising their police powers to protect health and morals. This ruling was echoed in a twentieth century case, Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, in which the Court expanded that exception to include advancing public welfare through a redistribution of resources. In recent years, some legal scholars have said that the federal Constitution’s contract clause has been eviscerated because the courts have ruled that its applicability is limited by so many public policy related exceptions. Nevertheless, it should be noted that many state constitutions contain contract impairment laws which are still applied, often in legal challenges to legislative changes in public employee pension fund benefits.
The freedom to contract and the expectation that contractual obligations will be enforced has been critical to American economic life since its founding. Courts have long been involved in the settling of contractual disputes, sometimes invoking the contract clause, but more often using common law principles or provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, which every state has adopted. But the implications of the freedom to contract is not limited to economic matters. Contracts are involved in many forms of association, including political organizations and civic and religious entities. Without protection for these contracts, these associations could not function effectively.
James C. Clinger, Ph.D., is an emeritus professor of political science at Murray State University. His teaching and research has focused on state and local government, public administration, regulatory policy, and political economy. His forthcoming co-edited book is entitled Local Government Administration in Small Town America.
 Cornell Law School. Legal Information Institute. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/contract Accessed August 12, 2023. On the view that contracts should be seen essentially as promises, see Fried, Charles. Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contracting Obligation. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981.
 Wallis, John Joseph. “Institutions, Organizations, Impersonality, and Interests: The Dynamics of Institutions.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 79 (1-2)
 Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. 1976. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305–60.
 Northwest Ordinance. Article II, Clause 5. See also McConnell, Michael W. “Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure.” California Law Review 76, no. 2 (1988): 267–95.
 Douglas W. Kmiec and John O. McGinnis, “The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding, 14 Hastings Const. Law Quarterly 5 (1987): 525-560.
 United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10
 Fletcher v. Peck. 10 US 87 (1810). See also Hobson, Charles F. 2017. “The Yazoo Lands Sale Case: Fletcher v. Peck (1810).” Journal of Supreme Court History 42 (3): 239–55.
 17 US 518. See also O’Kelley, C. R. T. (2021). What Was the Dartmouth College Case Really About? Vanderbilt Law Review, 74(6), 1645–1725.
 25 US 518 (1827).
 101 US 814 (1879).
 290 US 398 (1934).
 Ely, James W., Jr. “Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause?” Charleston Law Review 4 (2010): 371–94.
 Hull, Bradley. 2015. “State Contract Impairment Clauses and the Validity of Chapter 9 Authorization.” Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal 32 (1): 87–122.