Guest Essayist: Kevin Gutzman

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The essays in our study reference the following edition of Democracy In America: University of Chicago Press – 1st edition translated by Harvey Mansfield and Delba Winthrop. Today’s essay references pages 93 (starting at chapter 6) through 99 of this edition of Democracy in America.

Alexis De Tocqueville entitles Volume One, Part One, Chapter 6 of Democracy in America “On Judicial Power in the United States and Its Action on Political Society.” He attempts to describe American judicial institutions as if they were all of one model, along the way comparing them to the French courts more familiar to him and to his intended readers. Particularly notable to De Tocqueville as a foreign observer was the political role of American courts that we Americans have come to take for granted. “ The judicial power[‘s] … political power is so great,” he explains, “that it appeared to me that to speak of it in passing would diminish it in the eyes of readers.”

Federal, republican, and elective governments are not peculiar to America, this Frenchman notes, but the American judiciary is unique. Its weight is felt in every political discussion. In regard to particular cases, it exercises its power as other countries’ judiciaries do — “as an arbiter” between parties, “on particular cases and not on general principles” (that is, not on an advisory or legislative basis), and “only when it is appealed to” (that is, when a case is properly brought before it).

Yet, American judges, De Tocqueville insists, have political power of a remarkable kind: “Americans have recognized in judges the right to found their rulings on the Constitution rather than on the laws.” What he has in mind is that American judges exercise the power of judicial review, which he classifies as political, not legal. To an American, this distinction is jarring. We have all been indoctrinated in the idea, captured in Article VI of the United States Constitution and forcefully said to have been the bedrock of judicial review by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, that judicial review is precisely a legal function, that what is happening when a judge says a statute is to be inoperative (“struck down”) on the basis of unconstitutionality is that inferior law is being made to yield to superior law. As Marshall put it, “It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.”
It was by political acts that the sovereign states, following the Article VII ratification process, put the U.S. Constitution into effect, yes, but determining whether a law is constitutional in a case brought before it by one of the parties is for an American court a legal task, not a political one. De Tocqueville essentially concedes this point without making it when he notes that in America the people can, when they so desire, change a constitution (state or federal).

After comparing the relationships between law and constitution in the American system to the relationships between law and constitution in France and in Britain, De Tocqueville asserts that there is little to fear from judicial decisions holding laws unconstitutional, as they will only affect the particular cases the judges are deciding. Whether a statute will be repealed because unconstitutional is a question that will only be decided after several related cases have been adjudicated. Here our author is simply mistaken: decisions holding statutes unconstitutional have commonly had immediate and general effect since American courts first exercised the power of judicial review.

De Tocqueville next asserts that judges exercise the power of judicial review only despite themselves. They have no impulse to do so, he says. We are familiar with numerous instances in which Americans certainly were, or at least seem to have been, anxious to exercise the power of judicial review. At least one of them, the Supreme Court case of McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), ought to have been known to De Tocqueville. There had already been numerous cases of judicial review in federal courts by the 1830s, when De Tocqueville wrote his book, and they have come to be quite numerous now.

De Tocqueville closes this chapter with consideration of Article 75 of the French Constitution of year VIII (1799), which made Napoléon Bonaparte first consul. Under that constitution, he says, a government official could only be tried after the Council of State had decided he could. American courts have no need of such permission, he notes.

Kevin R. C. Gutzman, J.D., Ph.D. is Professor and former Chairman in the Department of History, Philosophy & World Perspectives at Western Connecticut State University. He is the author of six books in the history of the American Revolution and Early Republic, one of which was a New York Times bestseller, two of which were book club main selections, and one of which was named one of the ten outstanding conservative books of 2007. His latest is The Jeffersonians: The Visionary Presidencies of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe.

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Guest Essayist: Kevin Gutzman

 

John Adams’ narrow victory over Thomas Jefferson in the election of 1796 foreshadowed the contentious political environment of Adams’ sole term. Soon enough, the Republican opposition went into full battle mode, and Adams’ refusal to respond by playing party chieftain goes a long way toward explaining his narrow loss in 1800. Read more

Guest Essayist: Kevin R. C. Gutzman, J.D., Ph.D., Professor and Director of Graduate Studies Department of History, Western Connecticut State University and Author, James Madison and the Making of America

James Madison spent much of late 1786 and early 1787 at work on what one historian called his “research project.”  Having participated in helping bring about the interstate convention that was going to meet in Philadelphia in May 1787, he intended to apply both historical knowledge and practical experience to the task of shaping proposals he would make as a member of Virginia’s delegation to the convention.

To that end, he drafted a memorandum on the history of federal governments.  He also gathered his notes on problems in the American federal system under the Articles of Confederation into an eleven-point memorandum. Read more

Guest Essayist: Kevin R. C. Gutzman, J.D., Ph.D. Professor and Director of Graduate Studies Department of History, Western Connecticut State University and Author, James Madison and the Making of America

The Virginia Declaration of Rights is one of the key source documents of the U.S. Constitution.  This first American declaration of rights includes multiple provisions later echoed, and even copied, by the authors of the U.S. Constitution.  The Declaration’s chief author, George Mason, and one of the two other main contributors, James Madison, played extremely prominent roles in both the writing and ratification of the Constitution and the movement culminating in the Bill of Rights, so the resemblance is no surprise. Read more

Guest Essayist: Kevin R. C. Gutzman, M.P.Aff., J.D., Ph.D., Associate professor of the Department of History and Non-Western Cultures at Western Connecticut State University

http://vimeo.com/41058151

Amendment XIV, Section 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 1, Clause 2 of the 14th Amendment says, “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” This Privileges or Immunities Clause applies a prohibition previously limiting the Federal Government’s powers to the state governments.

From the Federal Government’s earliest days, the Supreme Court, the Congress, and the president assumed that when the Constitution used technical legal terms having fixed historic meanings, those terms were to be read as having those meanings. If we apply this rule of construction to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the precedent to which we must look is Justice Bushrod Washington’s decision in the case of Corfield v. Coryell (1823). In that case, Washington—sitting as circuit justice for Pennsylvania—described the “privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States,” mentioned in Article IV, Section 2.

According to Washington:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign…. They may … be all comprehended under the following general heads: protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one State to pass through, or to reside in any other State…; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the State…[,] to which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the enjoyment of them by the citizens of each State, in every other State, was manifestly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding provision in the old Articles of Confederation) “the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States of the Union.”

The first case in which the Supreme Court had an opportunity to construe the Privileges or Immunities Clause was The Slaughter-House Cases (1873). There, the Court divided the privileges and immunities of American citizens between those that are protected by state governments and those that are, as Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment puts it, “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” While it declined to list all of the ones that fell under the Fourteenth Amendment, it did say that virtually all of our rights remained rights of state citizenship, not rights “of citizens of the United States”—just as they had been before the Fourteenth Amendment.

So, some of the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” that it listed were “to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that government, to transact any business he may have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions[;] … the right of free access to its seaports, through which operations of foreign commerce are conducted, to the sub-treasuries, land offices, and courts of justice in the several States[;] … [a citizen’s right] to demand the care and protection of the Federal government over his life, liberty, and property when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government[;] … [t]he right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances[;] the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus[;] … the right to use the navigable waters of the United States, however they may penetrate the territory of the several States[;] … all rights secured to our citizens by treaties with foreign nations[;] … [the] privilege … to become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State[; … and] the rights secured by the thirteenth and fifteenth articles of amendment, and by the [rest of the] fourteenth….”

Nowadays, liberal critics commonly decry the Court’s decision in Slaughter-House for not creating numerous new rights for federal courts and Congress to enforce against the states under the cover of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, as the Slaughter-House majority pointed out, to have taken a different position would have made the Court the “censor” of all state and local legislation with a supervisory power over all state laws. While the 20th-century Supreme Court carved out precisely such a role for itself, the Reconstruction-era justices remained committed to the Founders’ vision of a decentralized government in which most decisions were made by elected officials. It is unsurprising that they did not behave as modern liberal judges would behave.

Kevin R. C. Gutzman, M.P.Aff., J.D., Ph.D. is an American historian and New York Times bestselling author. He is an associate professor of the Department of History and Non-Western Cultures at Western Connecticut State University.