Guest Essayist: Joshua Schmid

The Cold War was a time of immense tension between the world’s superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States. However, the two never came into direct conflict during the first decade and a half and rather chose to pursue proxy wars in order to dominate the geopolitical landscape. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 threatened to reverse this course by turning the war “hot” as the leader of the free world and the leader of the world communist revolution squared off in a deadly game of nuclear cat and mouse.

At the beginning of the 1960s, some members of the Soviet Union’s leadership desired more aggressive policies against the United States. The small island of Cuba, located a mere 100 miles off the coast of Florida, provided Russia with an opportunity. Cuba had recently undergone a communist revolution and its leadership was happy to accept Soviet intervention if it would minimize American harassments like the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev offered to place nuclear missiles on Cuba, which would put him within striking range of nearly any target on the continental U.S. The Cubans accepted and work on the missile sites began during the summer of 1962.

Despite an elaborate scheme to disguise the missiles and the launch sites, American intelligence discovered the Soviet scheme by mid-October. President John F. Kennedy immediately convened a team of security advisors, who suggested a variety of options. These included ignoring the missiles, using diplomacy to pressure the Soviets to remove the missiles, invading Cuba, blockading the island, and strategic airstrikes on the missile sites. Kennedy’s military advisors strongly suggested a full-scale invasion of Cuba as the only way to defeat the threat. However, the president ultimately overrode them and decided any attack would only provoke greater conflict with the Russians. On October 22, Kennedy gave a speech to the American people in which he called for a “quarantine” of the island under which “all ships of any kind bound for Cuba, from whatever nation or port, will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back.”

The Russians appeared unfazed by the bravado of Kennedy’s speech, and announced they would interpret any attempts to quarantine the island of Cuba as an aggressive act. However, as the U.S. continued to stand by its policy, the Soviet Union slowly backed down. When Russian ships neared Cuba, they broke course and moved away from the island rather than challenging the quarantine. Despite this small victory, the U.S. still needed to worry about the missiles already installed.

In the ensuing days, the U.S. continued to insist on the removal of the missiles from Cuba. As the haggling between the two nations continued, the nuclear launch sites became fully operational. Kennedy began a more aggressive policy that included a threat to invade Cuba. Amidst these tensions, the most harrowing event of the entire Cuban Missile Crisis occurred. The Soviet submarine B-59 neared the blockade line and was harassed by American warships dropping depth charges. The submarine had lost radio contact with the rest of the Russian navy and could not surface to refill its oxygen. The captain of B-59 decided that war must have broken out between the U.S. and Soviet Union, and proposed that the submarine launch its nuclear missile. This action required a unanimous vote by the top three officers onboard. Fortunately, the executive officer cast the lone veto vote against what surely would have been an apocalyptic action.

Eventually, Khrushchev and Kennedy reached an agreement that brought an end to the crisis. The Russians removed the missiles from Cuba and the U.S. promised not to invade the island. Additionally, Kennedy removed missiles stationed near the Soviet border in Turkey and Italy as a show of good faith. A brief cooling period between the two superpowers would ensue, during which time a direct communication line between the White House and the Kremlin was established. And while the Cold War would continue for three more decades, never again would the two blocs be so close to nuclear annihilation as they were in October 1962.

Joshua Schmid serves as a Program Analyst at the Bill of Rights Institute.

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Guest Essayist: Joshua Schmid

‘A Date Which Will Live in Infamy’

The morning of December 7, 1941 was another day in paradise for the men and women of the U.S. armed forces stationed at the Pearl Harbor Naval Base on Oahu, Hawaii. By 7:30 am, the air temperature was already a balmy 73 degrees. A sense of leisure was in the air as sailors enjoyed the time away from military duties that Sundays offered. Within the next half hour, the serenity of the island was shattered. Enemy aircraft streaked overhead, marked only by a large red circle. The pilots—who had been training for months for this mission—scanned their surroundings and set their eyes on their target: Battleship Row. The eight ships—the crown of the United States’ Pacific fleet—sat silently in harbor, much to the delight of the oncoming Japanese pilots, who began their attack.

Since the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the relationship between the United States and Japan had significantly deteriorated. Over the course of the ensuing decade, the U.S. imposed embargoes on strategic materials such as oil and froze Japanese assets to deter the Empire of the Rising Sun’s continual aggressions in the Pacific. For many in the American political and military leadership, it became not a question whether violent conflict would erupt between the two nations but rather when. Indeed, throughout the month of November 1941, the two military commanders at Pearl Harbor—Admiral Husband Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter Short—received multiple warnings from Washington, D.C. that conflict with Japan somewhere in the Pacific would very soon be a reality. In response, Kimmel and Short ordered that aircraft be moved out of their hangars at Pearl Harbor and lined up on runways in order to prevent sabotage. Additionally, radar—a new technology that had not yet reached its full capabilities—began operation a few hours a day on the island of Oahu. Such a lackluster response to war warnings can largely be attributed to the fact that American intelligence suspected that the initial Japanese strike would fall on U.S. bases in the remote Pacific such as at the Philippines or Wake Island. The logistical maneuvering it would take to carry out a large-scale attack on Pearl Harbor—nearly 4,000 miles from mainland Japan—seemed ludicrously impossible.

Such beliefs, of course, were immediately drowned out by the wails of the air raid sirens and the repeated message, “Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not a drill” on the morning of what turned out to be perhaps the most momentous day of the entire twentieth century. The Japanese strike force launched attacks from aircraft carriers in two waves. Torpedo and dive bombers attacked hangars and the ships anchored in the harbor while fighters provided strafing runs and air defense. In addition to the eight American battleships, a variety of cruisers, destroyers, and support ships were at Pearl Harbor.

A disaster quickly unfolded for the Americans. Many sailors had been granted leave that day given it was a Sunday. These men were not at their stations as the attack began—a fact that Japanese planners likely expected. Members of the American radar teams did in fact spot blips of a large array of aircraft before the attack. However, when they reported it to their superiors, they were told it was incoming American planes. The American aircraft that were lined up in clusters on runways to prevent sabotage now made easy targets for the Japanese strike force. Of the 402 military aircraft at Pearl Harbor and the surrounding airfields, 188 were destroyed and 159 damaged. Only a few American pilots were able to take off—those who did bravely took on the overwhelming swarm of Japanese aircraft and successfully shot a few down. Ships in the harbor valiantly attempted to get under way despite being undermanned, but with little success. The battleship Nevada attempted to lumber its way out of the narrow confines but her captain purposefully scuttled it to avoid blocking the harbor after it suffered multiple bomb hits. All eight of the battleships took some form of damage, and four were sunk. In the most infamous event of the entire attack, a bomb struck the forward magazine of the battleship Arizona, causing a mass explosion that literally ripped the ship apart. Of the nearly 2,500 Americans killed in the attack on Pearl Harbor, nearly half were sailors onboard the Arizona. In addition to the battleships, a number of cruisers, destroyers, and other ships were also sunk or severely damaged. In contrast, only 29 Japanese planes were shot down during the raid. The Japanese fleet immediately departed and moved to conduct other missions against British, Dutch, and U.S. holdings in the Pacific, believing that they had achieved the great strike that would incapacitate American naval power in the Pacific for years to come.

On the morning of the attack at Pearl Harbor, the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Saratoga was in port at San Diego on a mission. The other two carriers in the Pacific fleet were also noticeably absent from Pearl Harbor when the bombs began to fall. Japanese planners thought little of it in the ensuing weeks—naval warfare theory at the time was fixated on the idea of battleships dueling each other from long range with giant guns. Without their battleships, how could the Americans hope to stop the Japanese from dominating in the Pacific? However, within a year and a half, these three carriers would win a huge victory at the Battle of Midway and helped turn the tide in the Pacific in favor of the Americans and made it a carrier war.

The victory at Midway would give morale to an American people already hard at work since December 7, 1941 at mobilizing its entire society for war in one of the greatest human efforts in history. Of the eight battleships damaged at Pearl Harbor, all but the Arizona and Oklahoma were salvaged and returned to battle before the end of the war. In addition, the U.S. produced thousands of ships between 1941-1945 as part of a massive new navy. In the end, rather than striking a crushing blow, the Japanese task force merely awoke a sleeping giant who eagerly sought to avenge its wounds. As for the men and women who fought and died on December 7, 1941—a date that President Franklin Roosevelt declared would “live in infamy”—they will forever be enshrined in the hearts and minds of Americans for their courage and honor on that fateful day.

Joshua Schmid serves as a Program Analyst at the Bill of Rights Institute.

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Guest Essayist: Joshua Schmid

Realpolitik and Idealism Coupled: A Brief History of the Monroe Doctrine

The Monroe Doctrine remains one of the most influential foreign policy statements in United States history. The principles it espoused were largely consistent with the foreign affairs doctrine of non-interventionism in European affairs that were followed by the first U.S. presidents. Even by the twenty-first century, at times when U.S. geopolitical strategies were drastically different from those of the early nineteenth century, some foreign policy makers still invoked the Monroe Doctrine when prioritizing the spread of democracy and the well-being of the Western Hemisphere over other parts of the world. One of the key reasons for its longevity and success was because it established a foreign policy rooted in a combination of realism and idealism.

In the early days of the American republic, the U.S. remained largely uninvolved in the affairs of Europe and the rest of the world. As George Washington stated in his Farewell Address, “Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or a very remote relation…Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.” The young nation could ill-afford to become involved in the squabbling affairs of the Old World as it needed to focus more on its own internal development.

Despite the best attempts by the U.S. in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to avoid entanglements with Europe, foreign policy issues abounded. Spain, Britain, France, and Russia all sought to lay claim to vast swaths of territory on the North and South American continents. A number of these, especially Spanish colonies in Latin America, began revolutions in the early nineteenth century to claim self-governance. The so-called “Holy Alliance” of Prussia, Austria, and Russia emerged in 1815 after the Napoleonic Wars with the established purpose of protecting monarchy around the globe. After the Holy Alliance and France successfully re-instated the Spanish king following a revolution, it then turned to putting down the liberal revolutions occurring in the New World. The U.S. hardly blinked at the Spanish restoration as it had no impact on its affairs. However, the prospect of European armadas barging into the Western Hemisphere to put down movements that followed the spirit of the American Revolution posed a threat to U.S. security.

In response to potential intrusions into South America, U.S. President James Monroe decided to release a stunning declaration to the world. He laid out his policy in his Seventh Annual Message to Congress in December 1823. First, Monroe addressed the continual colonization of the New World by European powers, stating, “the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.” He then proceeded to discuss the attempts by European nations to interfere in Latin America’s revolutions. “With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected…The political system of [European monarchs] is essentially different…from that of America. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety,” Monroe continued. While Monroe conceded that European powers would be allowed to keep the colonies they held at the time, this announcement had the potential to drastically alter geopolitical affairs in the New World. By framing his doctrine in this manner, Monroe established a policy that simultaneously protected American interests in the Western Hemisphere while also supporting self-government from absolutism.

As bold of a declaration as the Monroe Doctrine was, it would have been largely ineffectual without the support of the British navy in helping to enforce it. The American navy did not have the resources to patrol the entire Western Hemisphere to prevent colonization by European powers. However, Britain—the most liberal of the major European powers of the time—did. It was using its navy to protect free trade around the world and the prospect of additional New World colonies, with their closed markets, would have harmed this economic policy. In fact, Britain’s Foreign Minister George Canning approached U.S. officials earlier in 1823 with a plan to release a joint-declaration to deter intervention in the New World. However, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams convinced Monroe that Britain had imperial motivations for wanting a joint-declaration, and a unilateral proclamation was announced. Even then, British self-interest in a largely de-colonized Western Hemisphere ensured that the U.S. would have a partner in enforcing its new hegemony.

The Monroe Doctrine helped the U.S. remain distant from European affairs and allowed it to chart a path to dominance in the Western Hemisphere. While initially largely symbolic, it would eventually be invoked by presidents ranging from Ulysses Grant to Teddy Roosevelt to John F. Kennedy to justify U.S. military interventions in the Western Hemisphere. According to the Monroe Doctrine, the success of American ideals of liberty and self-government in the Western Hemisphere went hand-in-hand with U.S. security. This coupling was in large part what made the doctrine so successful and why it has lasted as a cornerstone of American foreign policy. By claiming a hegemony in the New World that would support liberal values against absolutism, the U.S. began on its path to becoming the leader of the Free World for two centuries.

Joshua Schmid serves as a Program Analyst at the Bill of Rights Institute.

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Guest Essayist: Joshua Schmid

The Making of King Cotton: Eli Whitney’s Dogged Inventiveness

When one considers the great inventors of nineteenth-century America, few surpass Eli Whitney in both personal tenacity and the broader impact their works had on industrialization. Born on December 8, 1765 in Massachusetts, Whitney came of age during the American Revolution. As a boy, he enjoyed tinkering in his family’s workshop. One story tells that he stayed home on a Sunday to take apart his father’s watch while the rest of his family went to church. At the age of 12, Whitney created a violin—an incredible feat at such a young age. However, his tinkering was no mere hobby. The American Revolution was taking a toll on the colonial economy as men left their jobs to fight in the war or dedicated their trades to creating military equipment. Whitney heard that farmers around his home needed nails, and he soon created a forge to meet the demand.

After the American Revolution, Whitney studied and worked hard to pass entrance exams and pay to attend Yale. His intelligence and skills caught the eye of officials at the college, one of whom helped Whitney secure a job as a tutor in the South. The young man left his home area for South Carolina after graduation, but the job ended up falling through. Fortunately, Whitney had met Catherine Greene, the widow of Revolutionary War General Nathanael Greene, on his way south and accepted a position on her plantation in Savannah, Georgia.

On the Greene plantation, the New Englander witnessed the troubles of Southern agriculture first-hand. The strand of cotton that was best adapted to grow throughout the South—known as green-seed cotton—was high quality but contained many seeds within the fiber. These seeds needed to be removed before the raw cotton could be sent to textile mills. Whitney discovered that no effective machinery existed to remove the seeds, requiring laborers do the work by hand. The young man immediately set about to find a viable solution, recognizing that a machine that could minimize the workload of removing seeds would be hugely profitable. Whitney partnered with Phineas Miller, the manager of the plantation, in developing the machine. The two quickly produced a crude model of what became known as the cotton gin. This machine used combs to pull the seeds out and mesh to collect them while straining the finished fiber out.

In October 1793, Whitney wrote to Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson to apply for a patent for his invention. Jefferson was very intrigued by the device, replying, “As the state of Virginia, of which I am, carries on household manufactures of cotton to a great extent, as I also do myself, and one of our great embarrassments is the clearing the cotton of the seed, I feel a considerable interest in the success of your invention.” Whitney and Miller received a patent in March 1794 and developed a plan to travel to plantations to use the gin on farmers’ cotton in exchange for a portion of the completed supply. However, the cotton gin was not difficult to replicate, and many began to steal the design for themselves despite the patent. A variety of litigation cases followed as Whitney attempted to uphold his patent rights. However, a loophole in the laws at the time prevented the inventor from winning any of his court battles until 1807, at which point only a single year remained on his patent. He pleaded to Congress for a patent renewal, requesting in a letter to be “admitted to a more liberal participation with his fellow citizens, in the benefits of [the cotton gin],” but was denied on two separate occasions.

The cotton gin inadvertently increased demand for slavery in the South to meet the demands for the production of “King Cotton,” increasing sectional tensions in the country over the issue of human bondage. Whereas many of the founders believed that slavery would die a natural death because it was being restricted to the South where tobacco stripped the land of nutrients, the cotton gin helped breathe new life into the “peculiar institution.” Cotton and slavery spread to the new southern states in the early nineteenth century, and the scourge of human bondage in the country would exist until after the Civil War.

Joshua Schmid serves as a Program Analyst at the Bill of Rights Institute.

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