Guest Essayist: Craig Bruce Smith

From the United States capitol of New York City’s Federal Hall, Congress passed one of the earliest acts of the seven-months-old federal government: a pivotal piece of legislation for the defense of the new nation and its people.

Passed on September 29, 1789 and approved by President George Washington, the act legally formalized a national army. In so doing, the some hundred congressmen and senators formally rejected the deep Anglo-American fear of a standing army assuming dictatorial control.

Technically, this moment could be considered the birth of the modern US Army, as it was done under US Constitution of 1787 that we still follow today.[1] However, there were older variants of the army under the Continental Congress and the Articles of Confederation. So when was the US Army actually born?

Wordily titled, “An Act to recognize and adapt to the constitution of the United States, the establishment of the troops raised under the resolves of the United States in Congress assembled and for other purposes,” the 1789 bill voted into tangible existence the military alluded to in the US Constitution.[2] Only ratified the previous year, the Constitution frequently refers to war (and a navy and militias), but only offers a single mention of an army in Article 2, Section 2, which outlines the powers of the executive branch. Without clearly creating any such organization, the document merely mentions: “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”[3]

Though legally created in 1789, the US Army’s true roots begin earlier. The colonies had long embraced a tradition of local militias and maintained the deep fear of standing armies that affected the British Empire since the time of Oliver Cromwell and the English Civil War. But in the American Revolution, an army became a necessity to defend the people against British hostility.

On April 19, 1775, fighting between the British army and colonial militias broke out in Massachusetts at Lexington and Concord. It didn’t take long before Massachusetts patriot and future major general Dr. Joseph Warren wrote to the newly convened Second Continental Congress sitting in Philadelphia that British designs to “to ruin and destroy the inhabitants of this colony” had made “the establishment of an army indispensably necessary.” Warren pleaded with Congress “that a powerful Army, on the side of America” was “the only mean left to stem the rapid Progress of a tyrannical Ministry. Without a force, superior to our Enemies, we must reasonably expect to become the Victims of their relentless fury.”[4] Despite clearly linking the fighting in his home colony to the “Cause of America,” there was still debate about committing military support and the actual raising of an army. Was this really America’s war?

As colonial militias became a “New England Army” and the city of Boston was besieged, petitions of peace and questions of independence were considered by Congress, while they also made recommendations to logistically aid the colonial forces in Massachusetts and encouraged other colonies to do the same.[5] The term Continental Army was used as early as June 3, 1775, though no such organization formally existed.[6] Men like Warren and Massachusetts delegate John Adams had been adamant that the New England militias needed Congressional support. Warren wrote, clearly understanding Anglo-American fears of the unchecked authority of a standing army, “we tremble at having an army (although consisting of our countrymen) established here without a civil power to provide for and control them.”[7]

Finally, on June 14, 1775, Congress created the Continental Army out of a growing sense of unity and necessity. Congress also created an oath for soldiers and officers that placed the army under civilian governmental control: “I have, this day, voluntarily enlisted myself, as a soldier, in the American continental army…And I do bind myself to conform, in all instances, to such rules and regulations, as are, or shall be, established for the government of the said Army.”[8]

A five-person committee (George Washington, Philip Schuyler, Silas Deane, Thomas Cushing, and Joseph Hewes) was promptly assembled to create the named rules and regulations. The next day Colonel Washington, famed for his service in the French and Indian War, was “unanimously elected” and commissioned as the Continental Army’s commander-in-chief.[9] Though there were others who desired the post, Washington’s Virginian roots helped bridge a divide between the northern and southern colonies. While simultaneously declaring his reluctance to accept, Washington donned his military uniform and appeared in front of Congress to declare he was ready and willing to serve. Washington affirmed he would submit himself to congressional authority and “enter upon the momentous duty, and exert every power I possess in their service and for the support of the glorious cause” of American liberty.[10]

Leaving immediately for Boston, Washington took command in Cambridge, Massachusetts on July 3, 1775 shortly after the Battle of Bunker Hill. Almost from his first moment in command, Washington constantly promoted civilian supremacy over the army and demanded “a due observance of those articles of war, established for the government of the army.”[11] In surrendering his commission back to Congress at the conclusion of the war in 1783 (along with the near complete demobilization of the army itself), he alleviated fears of a dictator backed by a standing army and firmly established the legacy of civilian supremacy. This is arguably the greatest moment in American history.

A year later on June 3, 1784, Congress resolved under the Articles of Confederation (America’s first constitution) to create the peacetime Regular Army comprised of only 700 men (also known as the First American Regiment) for the purpose of “securing and protecting the northwestern frontiers” after acquiring new lands from Britain after the Peace of Paris.[12] But the military proved ineffective under the Articles, because states had more power than the federal government. Partly in response to the failure of the government and its forces to suppress rural uprisings, such as in western Massachusetts’ Shays’ Rebellion, a new constitutional convention was called.

The 1789 congressional act continued the intent of the army as outlined in 1784 and 1775 as it was designed to “protect the inhabitant of the frontier” and “be governed by the rules and articles of war which have been established by the United States in Congress.”[13]

The act also created the oath of service that spelled out civilian supremacy and marked the military’s loyalty to the Constitution and the government — not to an individual: “…I will support the constitution of the United States…against all enemies…and to observe and obey the orders of the President.”[14] A variation of this oath still guides the Army today.[15]

A force of 700 soldiers unsurprisingly proved ineffective for the growing nation. In 1792, the army was again structurally reformed and enlarged as the Legion of the United States before finally adopting the name the “army of the United States” or US Army in 1796.[16]

So when was the Army as we know it today founded? 1775, 1784, 1789, 1792, or 1796? The answer depends on if you take a literal or spiritual interpretation.

Though legally created in 1789 under the current Constitution, the US Army instead chooses the spirit of liberty drawn from the American Revolution and the creation of the Continental Army. After all, it is these very ideals of liberty that continue to guide its soldiers and officers, and the entire nation.

In 1956, President Dwight Eisenhower, former five-star general and Supreme Allied Commander, signed an executive order for the creation of a US Army flag that prominently featured the date “1775” and declared it a “suitable design and appropriate for adoption.”[17] Today, the US Army continues to celebrate June 14, 1775 as its official “birthday” with much fanfare, memorials, military balls, and cake.[18]

Craig Bruce Smith is a historian and the author of American Honor: The Creation of the Nation’s Ideals during the Revolutionary Era. For more information, visit or follow him on Twitter @craigbrucesmith. All views are that of the author and do not represent those of the Federal Government, the US Army, or Department of Defense.

[1] For more work on the history of the US Army, also used as references throughout this article: Matthew S. Muehlbauer and David J. Ulbrich. Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century. (New York: Routledge, 2014); Richard Stewart ED., American Military History. Volume I. (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2009); David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing.  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), Ch. 1; Richard H. Kohn. Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802. (New York: Free Press, 1975); Allen R. Millett and Peter Maslowski. For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States. (New York: Free Press, 2012).

[2]“An Act to recognize and adapt to the constitution of the United States, the establishment of the troops raised under the resolves of the United States in Congress assembled and for other purposes,” 29 September 1789.

[3] US Constitution, 1787,

[4] Joseph Warren to the Continental Congress, 3 May 1775, Journals of the Continental Congress.

[5] John Adams, Autobiography, June-August 1775, Massachusetts Historical Society.

[6] “Saturday, June 3, 1775 and “Saturday, June 10, 1775,” Journals of the Continental Congress.

[7] Joseph Warren to the Continental Congress, 16 May 1775, Journals of the Continental Congress. bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jc00225)):; Adams, Autobiography.

[8] “Wednesday June 14, 1775,” Journals of the Continental Congress,

[9] “Thursday June 15, 1775,” Journals of the Continental Congress,

[10] George Washington, “Address to the Continental Congress,” 16 June 1775, Founders Online.

[11] General Orders, 4 July 1775, Founders Online.

[12] “Thursday, June 3, 1784,” Journals of the Continental Congress, Vol. 27, p. 530

[13] “An Act to recognize…the establishment of the troops…,”

[14] First Congress, Session I, Ch. 27. Resolutions, 1789 in The Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America. (Boston: Little and Brown, 1845,) p. 95-96.

[15] US Army, “Oath of Enlistment,” and “Oath of Commissioned Officers,”

[16] A.J. Birtle. “The Origins of the Legion of the United States,” the Journal of Military History. (Vol. 67, No. 4, October 2003,) pp. 1249-1261; Fourth Congress, Session I, 1796,

[17] Dwight Eisenhower, 12 June 1756, Executive Order 10670, National Archives.

[18] John R. Maass, “June 14th: The Birthday of the U.S. Army,” US Army Center of Military History,; “Army Birthdays,”

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Guest Essayist: Craig Bruce Smith

In a wooded clearing overlooking an imposing rock formation, roughly sixty-five miles outside modern day Pittsburgh, the face of North America would be irreparably altered. On May 28, 1754 this spot witnessed the first shot of the French and Indian War (or the Seven Years’ War around the world). The shot was fired under the order, or possibly even by the hand, of a twenty-two-year-old Virginian militia officer named George Washington. At the break of dawn and under the cover of the forest, British, French, and Native forces engaged in this brief (but globally impactful) battle that escalated the long-simmering tension over the contested lands of the Ohio Valley into a world war felt on five continents.

For generations there had been a tenuous stalemate in the territory west of the Appalachian Mountains and east of the Mississippi River between the French, British, and various Native American nations. Thinly settled by European colonists, there was a lack of clear authority or the means to impose it. It was a situation that allowed the Natives to pit the two colonial powers against each other. But as these European empires attempted to expand, this balance was shattered. All accused the others of encroaching upon their lands and sovereignty.

By 1753, the French began building a series of fortifications in the Ohio Valley. That same year, Virginia Lt. Governor Robert Dinwiddie tasked surveyor-turned-newly-appointed-militia-major George Washington (who spoke no French, contrary to the expectations of the eighteenth-century British gentleman) with carrying a message to the French commander, Captain Jacques Legardeur de Saint-Pierre, to withdraw from the contested lands. No retreat followed.

The prize of the region was the coveted strategic position at the intersection of the Ohio, Monongahela, and Allegheny Rivers. The British had previously established a small outpost, named Fort Prince George (or Trent’s Fort after Pennsylvania trader William Trent), to control trade and stake their own claim. On April 17, 1754, a sizeable French force under Captain Claude-Pierre Pécaudy, sieur de Contrecœur, drove the tiny overmatched garrison at Trent’s Fort under Ensign Edward Ward to surrender without a shot being fired. In its place rose Fort Duquesne (today’s Pittsburgh): a symbol of French authority that challenged not only the British but also the Mingo people (part of the Ohio Iroquois) and their leader Tanacharison (also known as Tanaghrisson or “Half-King”).

The fall of Trent’s Fort sparked alarm in the Virginia capital of Williamsburg and before news even reached London the now Lieutenant Colonel Washington and his force of 159 militiamen were marching to the frontier to combat the French threat. From the standpoint of the British and their new Native allies, it could be asserted that French incursions had initiated hostilities, but what followed would escalate the conflict into a war.[i]

After Washington and his troops reached the Great Meadows (located in present-day Farmington, PA), Silver Heels, a Native scout and warrior, reported a band of some fifty French soldiers “hidden” in a nearby encampment in a small glen surrounded by the dense wilderness. Their intentions were clearly set on ambushing Washington and his men, at least according to Tanacharison. The Mingo chief may have let personal matters influence his assessment of the situation, as he was convinced the French meant to murder him and his family. He alleged that this patrol was there “to take and kill all the English they should meet.”[ii] Washington decided to act.

Under the cover of darkness and a torrent of rain, a mixed band of forty militiamen and twelve Natives crept single file though the woods and surrounded the unsuspecting French patrol. As night turned to morning, Washington stood atop a rocky hill, looked down upon his adversaries, gave the command to fire, and personally loosed the first shot (as a signal or with aim is unclear).[iii] A volley immediately followed his discharge. Washington claimed the startled French, commanded by Ensign Joseph Coulon de Villiers, Sieur de Jumonville, had “discovered” them and the initial shots were to stop their mad dash to arm themselves. The French version differed, but regardless multiple volleys flashed on both sides. The battle (probably better described as a skirmish) only lasted about fifteen minutes and ended as quickly as it began, with the French “routed” by British bullets and at least some of the retreating men meeting “their destiny by the Indian tomahawks” wielded by Tanacharison and his warriors. Just over twenty Frenchmen survived.[iv]

Their wounded commander, Jumonville, claimed he was on a diplomatic mission. much like Washington had been in 1753. If it were true, under the rules of war and honor, the French ambassador should not have been attacked, as his “character being always sacred.”[v] But this was after the fact and there was a clear communication problem between the two leaders: Jumonville spoke French and Washington only understood English. Tanacharison, having dealt with each colonial power, was fluent in both. Before Washington could make sense of what was happening, Tanacharison buried his tomahawk into Jumonville’s head, killing him on the spot. Removing his embedded hatchet, the Mingo leader turned to French officer Michel Pepin dit La Force and taunted him “now I will let you see that the Six Nations [of Iroquois] can kill as well as the French.”[vi] As the chief raised his blood-drenched blade, the terrified La Force hid behind an undoubtedly shocked Washington who intervened, saved the man’s life, and stopped any further slaughter.

Why had Tanacharison acted this way? Perhaps it was to escalate the conflict to a full-fledged war. Or perhaps it was to defend himself, his family, and his people from what he perceived as French aggression Despite Tanacharison vehement assertions that the French “intentions were evil,” the affair ensured that Washington “never” again dealt with these Native allies or their leader.[vii]

Though the Virginian officer had not ordered the deathblow, his sense of honor, the possibility of truth of the diplomatic mission, and the lack of quarter given to the wounded Jumonville likely troubled him deeply and he feared its implications. Washington’s account of the incident to Dinwiddie glossed over it, saying, “amongst those that were killed was Monsieur De Jumonville the Commander.”[viii] In turn, Washington who was in command omitted Tanacharison’s execution, perhaps because it would reflect a lack of control or authority on the part of the novice Virginian officer.

Still, the full magnitude of this event would not be felt until a few months later in early July, when the again-promoted Col. Washington’s Virginia regiment (joined by those of Captain James Mackay’s South Carolina Independent Company) were besieged inside the wooden palisades of Fort Necessity on the nearby Great Meadows by a vastly superior French force. At the head of the 600 attackers was Captain Louis Coulon de Villiers, Jumonville’s older brother, who was tasked with seeking reprisals for the Battle of Jumonville Glen. Washington and Mackay were forced to surrender. Again plagued by his lack of French, Washington signed the Articles of Capitulation improperly translated by Jacob Van Braam, his former fencing master who possessed a limited grasp of French himself. He thought it said “death” or “killing of,” which was technically accurate, but it actually declared that he had assassinated Jumonville, who was on a diplomatic mission.[ix] This was considered a violation of one of the technically inviolable rules of war. But the grievous language would only be revealed after the French published the document—shaming Washington and Britain before the world.

The young Virginian attempted to defend his honor by refusing to accept this version of events and continued to insist, to both himself and the world, that Jumonville was not a diplomat, but “only a simple petty French officer; an ambassador has no need of spies.” Considering the standards of gentility of the time, Jumonville’s dress, bearing, and actions, in Washington’s estimation, precluded his being an emissary—he didn’t look the part. Rather, he argued, the French diplomatic mission was simply “A plausible pretense to discover our camp, and to obtain the knowledge of our forces and our situation!”[x]

But regardless of Washington’s justifications, his signature allowed the French to cast him as an “assassin,” and while the British disregarded the charge, it gave King Louis XV a pretext for a war. Despite initially drawing harsh British criticism, Washington’ reputation would survive and thrive as a “noble” hero based on his relationship with Dinwiddie and the influential aristocratic Fairfax family. Though he never altered his story, Washington would consider the lesson throughout his life, especially during the American Revolution, where he dealt with British Major John André (part of Benedict Arnold’s treason) as a spy, despite his looking the part of a gentleman.[xi]

While the Battle of Jumonville Glen may not be considered the start of the war from the British perspective, it resulted in an expanded colonial conflict engulfing the world in violence, which then began the rift between Britain and their colonists that set the stage for the American Revolution.

Craig Bruce Smith is a historian and the author of American Honor: The Creation of the Nation’s Ideals during the Revolutionary Era. For more information visit or follow him on Twitter @craigbrucesmith. All views are that of the author and do not represent those of the Federal Government, the US Army, or Department of Defense.

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[i] For an excellent overview of the French and Indian War and its early battles see the following referenced throughout this article: Fred Anderson. The War that Made America: A Short History of the French and Indian War. (New York: Viking, 2005); David Preston. Braddock’s Defeat: The Battle of the Monongahela. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). For a brief overview of the incident at Jumonville Glen, also referenced throughout: Joseph F. Stoltz III, “Jumonville Glen Skirmish,” Digital Encyclopedia of George Washington,

[ii] George Washington, “Expedition to the Ohio,” 1754, Founders Online.,

[iii] “An Ohio Iroquois Warrior’s Account of the Jumonville Affair, 1754,” in Preston, Braddock’s Defeat, Appendix E and p. 25-28.

[iv] Washington, “Expedition to the Ohio,”1754; “An Ohio Iroquois Warrior’s Account of the Jumonville Affair, 1754”; Stoltz, “Jumonville Glen Skirmish.”

[v] Washington, “Expedition to the Ohio,”1754.

[vi] “An Ohio Iroquois Warrior’s Account of the Jumonville Affair, 1754.”

[vii] Washington, “Expedition to the Ohio,” 1754, Founders Online.

[viii] George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, 29 May 1754, Founders Online.

[ix] “Articles of Capitulation,” [3 July 1754], Founders Online.; Paul K. Longmore. The Invention of George Washington. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1999), p. 22-24.

[x] Washington, “Expedition to the Ohio,” 1754, Founders Online; Craig Bruce Smith, American Honor: The Creation of the Nation’s Ideals during the Revolutionary Era. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018), p. 38-40.

[xi] Smith, American Honor, p. 38-40, 160.


American Revolution and Expanding the States – How the American Revolution and nationhood voided the Proclamation Line of 1763, allowing expansion for American settlement of the Western frontier

In 1763, with “the scratch of a pen,” North America had changed forever.[1] After years of looming as an ever-present danger, the French threat had finally been removed from Canada and the lands east of the Mississippi. The territory had been hard won as a result of the 1763 Treaty of Paris that formally ended the French and Indian War waged on the British colonies’ western frontier since 1754. “That Enemy who hath so long stuck like a Thorn in the Sides of our Colonies is removed,” wrote Massachusetts governor Francis Bernard; now “North-America” was “[e]ntirely British.”[2] Native American unrest followed. That same year, the newly crowned King George III, fearful of further rebellion and citing it as “essential to our Interest,” stopped western expansion with a theoretical line on a map that ran through the Appalachian Mountains (which run from modern day Canada to Alabama).[3] The Proclamation of 1763, as it was known, barred Americans from collecting their promised spoils of war, and unknowingly became one of the American Revolution’s earliest causes.

The French and Indian War had been fought globally, but had been ignited in America over disputed lands just west of the Appalachians that the British, French, and Natives each believed to be rightfully their territory. At the center of the outbreak was a twenty-two-year-old Lt. Col. George Washington of the Virginia Militia, whose expedition and skirmish in the area around modern-day Pittsburgh had in part sparked the conflict. Washington was one of many American colonists who would fight for King and Country, but who also hoped to reap the lucrative gains of the frontier.

Peace was supposed to place the land into the waiting hands of American colonists. But as speculators laid claim to millions of acres and settlers migrated to reap the benefits of the rich farmlands of the Ohio Valley, it sparked a rebellion of unified Native American tribes.[4] Known as Pontiac’s Rebellion, the conflagration was ultimately suppressed at great British expense and effort. Hoping to stop an unrestrained colonial rush into the west in order to prevent further Native hostility (and both to retain control over the colonies and trade and to promote settlement in Quebec and Florida), the Proclamation halted American migration and “reserve[d]” the land “under” the King’s “Sovereignty, Protection, and Dominion, for the use of the said Indians.”[5]

Although the Proclamation was virtually unenforceable and was deemed temporary, the royal decree still triggered a sharp backlash and even outward violence from colonists who had invested in western lands, sought to settle, or been denied their promised rewards for military service. From the Mississippi Land Company to the Ohio Company, potential fortunes had been stifled, as land could not formally change hands from the Natives without royal approval and licensing.

Still, colonial resistance to the Proclamation of 1763 went beyond personal economic interests. It was one of the first of many British failings that colonists saw as distancing them from the mother country. The British Army, which was supposed to defend all subjects yet was historically viewed with deep fear by Anglo-Americans, was potentially weaponized to avenge the King’s “Displeasure.”[6] Colonists were limited in their movement, their property rights were hindered, and more substantially promises offered by the Crown had been invalidated. Furthermore, it seemingly protected Native Americans’ interests over the American colonists’. It created “two distinct worlds” whereby any claims to being a subject disappeared west of the line and the military held authority.[7] Colonists, like Washington, pressed their western claims up to and beyond the Revolution’s outbreak. As he complained, regardless of whether the Proclamation was “founded in good, or ill policy,” a promise of land grants had been made to French and Indian War veterans — one that was “to all Intents & purposes considered, as a mutual contract.”[8]

Although the Proclamation wasn’t actively enforced and with the line pushed further west due to the Treaties of Fort Stanwix and Hard Labor in 1768 and the Treaty of Lochaber in 1770 (prompting further speculation), the Second Continental Congress meeting in Philadelphia in 1776 still considered the issue as worthy of inclusion in the Declaration of Independence. For, in the Patriot view, the King “endeavoured to prevent the population of these States,” and “refus[ed]…to encourage their migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.”[9] In doing so, the Congress acknowledged the Proclamation as being more than just a financial issue; it was a long remembered ideological and governmental grievance.

Twenty years after the 1763 Treaty of Paris opened the frontier to American colonists, the 1783 Treaty of Paris both ended the Revolution and ceded all lands east of the Mississippi River to the United States. Under the Articles of Confederation there was further delay in western expansion by design and conflict over territorial claims between various states.[10] It was under the new U.S. Constitution that additional disputes were resolved, existing state borders formalized and expanded westward, and the remaining lands organized into the Northwest and Southwest Territories, with statehood dependent upon population.[11] Furthermore, Secretary of War Henry Knox attempted to spread American “civilization” to the Native Americans, as he believed it would “most probably be attended with the salutary effect of attaching them to the Interest of the United States.”[12] In 1792, Kentucky entered the United States as the fifteenth state and first in the region formerly barred by the Proclamation of 1763 (Tennessee and Ohio would follow shortly). Although the paper barrier had fallen, tension with the British (as well as the Spanish) and Natives remained, as the land, its culture, and its borders were contested through the War of 1812. Meanwhile, the issue of the expansion or restriction of slavery in the new states simmered for over half a century, before erupting in the Civil War.

Craig Bruce Smith is the author of American Honor: The Creation of the Nation’s Ideals during the Revolutionary Era and an assistant professor of history at William Woods University. For more information:

[1] Colin G. Calloway. The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America. (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 14-15.

[2] Ibid.

[3] The Royal Proclamation, Oct. 7, 1763.

[4] For economic motivation see: Woody Holton. Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).

[5] The Royal Proclamation, Oct. 7, 1763.; Jennifer Monroe McCutchen. “Proclamation Line of 1763,” Digital Encyclopedia of George Washington.; Fred Anderson. Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766. (New York: Vintage, 2000), p. 580.

[6] Ibid; Calloway. The Scratch of a Pen, p. 92-93.

[7] Patrick Griffin. American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and the Revolutionary Frontier. (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007), p. 21; Alan Taylor. American Revolutions. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2016), p. 61; Brendan McConville. The King’s Three Faces: The Rise & Fall of Royal America, 1688-1776. (Chapel Hill: Omohundro, 2006), p. 235.

[8] George Washington to Lord Botetourt, 8 Dec. 1769. Founders Online.

[9] The Declaration of Independence. 4 Jul. 1776,

[10] Benjamin Harrison to Virginia Delegates, 19 September 1783, footnote 3.

[11] US Constitution, 1787,; Northwest Ordinance, 1787,;

Southwest Ordinance, 1790

[12] Henry Knox to George Washington. 7 July. 1789. Founders Online.

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