The Mode of Electing the President
From the New York Packet
Friday, March 14, 1788.

Author: Alexander Hamilton

To the People of the State of New York:

THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the election of the President is pretty well guarded. [1] I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the advantages, the union of which was to be wished for.

It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen by the people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.

It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations.

It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be dreaded in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so important an agency in the administration of the government as the President of the United States. But the precautions which have been so happily concerted in the system under consideration, promise an effectual security against this mischief. The choice of SEVERAL, to form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of ONE who was himself to be the final object of the public wishes. And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place.

Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. These most deadly adversaries of republican government might naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more than one quarter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils. How could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own to the chief magistracy of the Union? But the convention have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most provident and judicious attention. They have not made the appointment of the President to depend on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment. And they have excluded from eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. No senator, representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit under the United States, can be of the numbers of the electors. Thus without corrupting the body of the people, the immediate agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. Their transient existence, and their detached situation, already taken notice of, afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so, to the conclusion of it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace so considerable a number of men, requires time as well as means. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to embark them, dispersed as they would be over thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon motives, which though they could not properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from their duty.

Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his official consequence. This advantage will also be secured, by making his re-election to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important choice.

All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the convention; which is, that the people of each State shall choose a number of persons as electors, equal to the number of senators and representatives of such State in the national government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the national government, and the person who may happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes will be the President. But as a majority of the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be conclusive, it is provided that, in such a contingency, the House of Representatives shall select out of the candidates who shall have the five highest number of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for the office.

The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill administration. Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says: “For forms of government let fools contest That which is best administered is best,” yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.

The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in respect to the former, what is to be done by the House of Representatives, in respect to the latter.

The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President, has been objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. It has been alleged, that it would have been preferable to have authorized the Senate to elect out of their own body an officer answering that description. But two considerations seem to justify the ideas of the convention in this respect. One is, that to secure at all times the possibility of a definite resolution of the body, it is necessary that the President should have only a casting vote. And to take the senator of any State from his seat as senator, to place him in that of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the State from which he came, a constant for a contingent vote. The other consideration is, that as the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for the President, in the supreme executive magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one, apply with great if not with equal force to the manner of appointing the other. It is remarkable that in this, as in most other instances, the objection which is made would lie against the constitution of this State. We have a Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at large, who presides in the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor, in casualties similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to exercise the authorities and discharge the duties of the President.

PUBLIUS.

1. Vide FEDERAL FARMER.

Howdy from Texas! As I read Federalist Papers No. 68 and 69 it becomes evident in a factual way how earnestly and tenaciously our founding. Constitutional forefathers strove to protect our liberties and our Republic. Once again, they based their decisions, not on rhetoric or reason but on the wisdom wrought by history.

In no circumstance was this more evident than in regard to the election of the President of the United States. In Federalist Paper No. 68, Alexander Hamilton, states this with precision and clarity.

“Nothing was more to be desired, than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue and corruption. These most deadly adversaries of Republican government, might naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more than one quarter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils.”

Could this be more relevant throughout our history and even today? We, and democracy, have been under continuous attack from varied countries for the past two centuries and we are under attack today. “The enemy is in the field,” whether it be via the insidious silencing by an overzealousness of  “political correctness” or a literal attack on our soil.

America represents hope and hope is the envy of the enemy.

Our founding fathers wanted to protect our Republic from intrigue and corruption with the establishment of the electoral process. This provided a sort of perspective permeating through the passions of the people as well as a balance of power throughout the country. In times of peace and prosperity the perspective of an electorate seems redundant. Never have we seen, nor experienced the horrors that our forefathers endured that warranted and verified the need to establish such a window of wisdom laid in the hands of a few. Tyranny can easily slide in our backdoor while we slumber. Today, soldiers don’t beckon at our door to spend the night in our homes – this doesn’t mean it may not happen yet again.

Our only guarantee lies within the guarding and respecting and understanding the premise and principles upon which our Constitution was established.

We must never let ourselves be so far removed from the history or teaching of tyranny that we relinquish the reigns to the horse that pulls the cart. If we do this, our horse will pull our cart over a cliff into an oblivion of despair that will then be beyond our control.

“Liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people.” John Adams.

Liberty cannot be sustained without a general knowledge of the United States Constitution.

The Electoral College is also important because it balances the power between the states. If we abolished the electoral process then the more populated states, such as California, Texas and New York would control the policies and direction of the country. One has to wonder about the “winner takes all” policy regarding the electorate that exists presently in all of the states except Maine and Nebraska. My understanding of “winner takes all” is that it undermines the electoral process. It also may falsely represent the political inclination of the states and eliminate electoral votes from certain regions that could, when added all together, actually determine an election. Is, “winner takes all” a violation of the United States Constitution? Does it circumvent the amendment process?

Federalist Paper No. 68 is enlightening and intriguing. Federalist Paper No. 69 is a smart, insightful comparison of our United States Constitution with the British rule of the king. Revealing are the nine points Alexander Hamilton makes by this exercise: Term limited, Impeachment possible, Checks by the legislative body, Power to command the military but not declare war or raise arms, Treaties made with concurrent power of the legislature, Appointment of officers with approval of the legislature, No power to convey privileges, Can prescribe no rules concerning commerce or coins, No particle of spiritual jurisdiction.

The comparison of the United States Constitutional restrictions to those of the British crown are awesome and revealing. Brilliant were the checks instilled upon the Executive branch of the United States’ government. This, of course, begs the question how have these limits prevailed today?

My curiosity is peeked by Alexander Hamilton’s statement about the President’s power of nomination being just that – a nomination – approved by the Senate – in ALL categories.

“The President is to nominate, and, WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers, judges of the Supreme Court, and in general all officers of the United States established by law, and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the Constitution.

The President’s nominations of ambassadors, public ministers, judges, and in general all officers of the United States established by law and whose appointment are not otherwise provided for by the Constitution must be held to the scrutiny and “consent of the senate.”

How does the bloating of our modern day federal government, with unapproved and unchecked “bureaucrats and czars,” fair under this Constitutional scrutiny? These are the bleeds that rupture the heart of a Republic and threaten a seizure of the people.

Thoughts to ponder.

God Bless,

Janine Turner

Tuesday, August 3rd, 2010

 

 

Greetings from Long Beach Island, New Jersey! The Gillespies are on our family vacation, and it has been a little hard to keep up with the essays, but I am determined to catch up!  In case you are wondering, the weather has been beautiful, the water warmer than usual, and we have been visiting with Ed’s extended family, his brothers and sisters and all the Greco cousins! There are at least 30 members of the Gillespie and Greco families here now, with the Moore cousins on the way, on Thursday!

The electoral college, the subject of Federalist No. 68, is one of the least understood components of the United States governmental structure.  I recommend this website for anyone who wants to brush up on the subject:  http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/

It is so important we all understand the electoral college and its importance to our republican form of government.  There has a been a recent movement to abolish the electoral college.  But another movement to persuade states to adopt proportional voting, instead of the traditional “winner-take-all” method, is also gaining momentum.

My daughter, Mollie Gillespie, writes about the advantage of states adopting a proportional system of allocating their electoral college votes on Juliette Turner’s new Kids’ Blog.  Click on this link and scroll down for Mollie’s essay:  https://constitutingamerica.org/juliette/?p=18

Check out Juliette’s Blog, and ask your kids to participate!  Juliette is reading the Making of America, and writing about it.  She is also encouraging kids to start Patriot’s Clubs!

Inspire our next generation to want to learn about the Constitution and our country’s founding principles! Forward out links to Juliette’s blog, and help your kids start Patriots’ clubs.  Take the time to teach your kids about the electoral college!  They find this subject fascinating, when it is explained to them.  Use the website   http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/ as a guide.

As we have said numerous times on these pages, knowledge is power! Let’s make sure our next generation is knowledgable, so they have the power to determine their future, and the future of our great country.

Good night and God Bless,

Cathy Gillespie

Sunday, August 1st, 2010

Guest Essayist: Joerg Knipprath, Professor of Law at Southwestern Law School

Federalist 68 to 72 address the election and structure of the Presidency. Who better to address that than Alexander Hamilton, whose knowledge of executive power combines with an affinity for it that caused much suspicion during his political career?

The first essay is a brief foray into the Electoral College. The matter excited so little passion during the ratification debates that Hamilton barely gets his writing hand limbered up. He allows himself to wax poetic and substitute a couplet edited from Alexander Pope’s Essay on Man for some of the acerbic put-downs of his preceding efforts as Publius. Yet, the frivolity of the approach should not obscure the delicate political balances reflected in the constitutional settlement of the President’s election. The Framers’ had rejected direct popular election (an easy call due to its profound conflict with the idea of the United States as a confederated republic), election by Congress, election by the state legislatures, and election by electors selected by regional electors elected by the people (Hamilton’s multi-layered proposal).

The Framers wanted at once to have an energetic executive and to prevent the emergence of an American Caesar. The first would be accomplished by unity in the office, the latter through, among other things, care in the selection of the person. They also were deeply fearful that some foreign power might place a Manchurian Candidate among the presidential contenders. Hamilton mentions that concern in his defense of the system, a concern also reflected in the requirement that the President be a natural-born citizen. This was no small matter to the Framers. There were various plots and other connections between foreign agents and American politicians and military officers (the Wilkinson/Burr cabal with Spain, for example). Moreover, these kinds of intrigues to place a foreigner in executive office were familiar, both because they were common abroad, and because of the Confederation Congress’s offer in 1786, quickly withdrawn, to the republican-minded Prince Henry of Prussia to become regent of the U.S.

The Framers faced several practical problems. Every efficient electoral system has to provide for a means of nominating and then electing candidates. Moreover, civil disturbances over what is often a politically heated process must be avoided. There must be no taint of corruption. The candidate elected must be qualified.

As to the first, the Electoral College would, in many cases, nominate multiple candidates. Electors would be chosen as the legislatures of the states would direct. Though the practice of popular voting for electors spread, not until South Carolina seceded from the Union in 1860 did appointment by the legislatures end everywhere. Once selected, the electors’ strong loyalties to their respective states likely would cause the electors to select a “favorite son” candidate. To prevent a multiplicity of candidates based on state residency, electors had to cast one of the two votes allotted to each for someone from another state. It was expected that several regional candidates would emerge under that process. There likely would be no single majority electoral vote recipient, at least not after George Washington. The actual election of the President then would devolve to the House of Representatives, fostering the blending and overlapping of powers that Madison extolled in Federalist 51.

That last step corresponded to the Framers’ experience with the election of the British prime minister and cabinet, and with the practice of several states. However, consistent with the state-oriented structure of American federalism, such election in the House had to come through a majority of state delegations, not individual Congressmen. Though modified slightly by the Twelfth Amendment as a result of the deadlock of 1800, this process is still in place.

The Electoral College also was to be the mediating device that would balance the desire for popular input with the realistic concern that a direct popular vote would promote candidates with “talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity.” Hamilton, a skilled in-fighter, possessed very sharp elbows politically, but lacked those particular talents and despised them in others. As John Jay writes in Federalist 64, the Constitution’s system would likely select those most qualified to be President. Augmented by the Constitution’s age requirement for President, the electors are not “liable to be deceived by those brilliant appearances of genius and patriotism, which, like transient meteors, sometimes mislead as well as dazzle.”

Having the voters select a group of electors, rather than the President directly, would also calm the political waters. By making that election something other than a vote about particular candidates, the process would encourage reflection and deliberation by voters about the capacity for reasoned judgment of the electors chosen. The smaller number of wise electors, in turn, would exercise that judgment free from popular passion.

There is also the problem of corruption of the electors. Every polity must address that. The Republic of Venice had a truly byzantine system of election and selection by lot of those whose sole responsibility it would be to elect the Doge (the executive). The sheer number of participants and the unpredictability of the eventual identity of the Venetian electors made vote-buying, influence-peddling, and intimidation impractical. In Federalist 68, as well, Hamilton assures the reader that, in the American system, corruption and the influence of faction are avoided by the temporary and limited duty of the electors, the disqualification of federal office holders to serve, the large number of electors, and the fact that they meet in separate states at the same time. Presumably, those protections fall away when the House elects the President. But Congressmen have to worry about re-election and, thus, want to avoid corrupt bargains that are odious to the voters.

Though the constitutional shell remains, much of the system operates differently than the Framers hoped. The reason is the evolution of the modern programmatic party, that bane of good republicans, which has replaced state loyalties with party loyalties. The Framers thought they had dealt adequately with the influence of factions in their finely-tuned system. As modern party government was just emerging in Britain and—in contrast to temporary and shifting political factions—unknown in the states, the Framers designed the election process unprepared for such parties.

Today, the nominating function is performed by political parties, while election is, in practice, by the voters. Elections by the House are still possible, if there is a strong regional third-party candidate. But the dominance of the two parties (which are, in part, coalitions of factions) suppresses competition, and the last time there was a reasonable possibility of electoral deadlock was in 1968, when Alabama Governor George C. Wallace took 46 electoral votes. Mere independent national candidacies, such as that of Ross Perot in 1992, have roughly similar levels of support in all states and are unlikely to siphon electoral votes and block the usual process.

Parties have had a beneficial effect in that they have prevented repetitions of the debacles of 1800 (when, due to the tie vote between Jefferson and Burr, it took the House 36 ballots and probable political intervention by Hamilton on the former’s behalf to resolve the election) and of 1824 (when the election dominated by just the regional candidacies anticipated by the Framers was thrown into the House and extensive bargaining precipitated charges of corruption that stymied the J. Q. Adams presidency). Had parties not emerged to provide necessary lubrication, the creaky constitutional machinery well might have had to be reformed. Though they have smoothed the process, parties arguably also have promoted the very evils (other than foreign intrigue) that Publius assured his readers were avoided under the electoral system designed by the Framers.

At the same time, the emergence of modern political parties has not made the Electoral College obsolete, as it still promotes important values. It reinforces the founding principle that the U.S. is a confederated republic and not a consolidated national government, as analyzed so persuasively by Madison in Federalist 39. Despite the occasional misfire, as in the election of 2000, the Electoral College often gives the narrow victor in the popular vote a mandate through a significant electoral college majority. The need to find a lot of electoral votes to overturn such a result reduces the likelihood of persistent challenges. Elections such as 1948, 1960, 1968, and 1992 come to mind. Proposals to change or abolish the Electoral College have appeared frequently since the Constitution’s adoption and are of predictable types. But they always lose steam, as there has been no showing that they will serve republican values better than the current system. Indeed, efforts to change the system have declined in the last half century, even after the contested election of 2000, a testimony to the enduring legitimacy of the Electoral College.

Friday, July 30th, 2010

An expert on constitutional law, Prof. Joerg W. Knipprath has been interviewed by print and broadcast media on a number of related topics ranging from recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions to presidential succession. He has written opinion pieces and articles on business and securities law as well as constitutional issues, and has focused his more recent research on the effect of judicial review on the evolution of constitutional law.  Prof. Knipprath has also spoken on business law and contemporary constitutional issues before professional and community forums.  His website is http://www.tokenconservative.com

 

Howdy from Texas! As I read Federalist Papers No. 68 and 69 it becomes evident in a factual way how earnestly and tenaciously our founding Constitutional forefathers strove to protect our liberties and our Republic. Once again, they based their decisions, not on rhetoric or reason but on the wisdom wrought by history.

In no circumstance was this more evident than in regard to the election of the President of the United States. In Federalist Paper No. 68, Alexander Hamilton, states this with precision and clarity.

“Nothing was more to be desired, than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue and corruption. These most deadly adversaries of Republican government, might naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more than one quarter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils.”

Could this be more relevant throughout our history and even today? We, and democracy, have been under continuous attack from varied countries for the past two centuries and we are under attack today. “The enemy is in the field,” whether it be via the insidious silencing by an overzealousness of  “political correctness” or a literal attack on our soil.

America represents hope and hope is the envy of the enemy.

Our founding fathers wanted to protect our Republic from intrigue and corruption with the establishment of the electoral process. This provided a sort of perspective permeating through the passions of the people as well as a balance of power throughout the country. In times of peace and prosperity the perspective of an electorate seems redundant. Never have we seen, nor experienced the horrors that our forefathers endured that warranted and verified the need to establish such a window of wisdom laid in the hands of a few. Tyranny can easily slide in our backdoor while we slumber. Today, soldiers don’t beckon at our door to spend the night in our homes – this doesn’t mean it may not happen yet again.

Our only guarantee lies within the guarding and respecting and understanding the premise and principles upon which our Constitution was established.

We must never let ourselves be so far removed from the history or teaching of tyranny that we relinquish the reigns to the horse that pulls the cart. If we do this, our horse will pull our cart over a cliff into an oblivion of despair that will then be beyond our control.

“Liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people.” John Adams.

Liberty cannot be sustained without a general knowledge of the United States Constitution.

The Electoral College is also important because it balances the power between the states. If we abolished the electoral process then the more populated states, such as California, Texas and New York would control the policies and direction of the country. One has to wonder about the “winner takes all” policy regarding the electorate that exists presently in all of the states except Maine and Nebraska. My understanding of “winner takes all” is that it undermines the electoral process. It also may falsely represent the political inclination of the states and eliminate electoral votes from certain regions that could, when added all together, actually determine an election. Is, “winner takes all” a violation of the United States Constitution? Does it circumvent the amendment process?

Federalist Paper No. 68 is enlightening and intriguing. Federalist Paper No. 69 is a smart, insightful comparison of our United States Constitution with the British rule of the king. Revealing are the nine points Alexander Hamilton makes by this exercise: Term limited, Impeachment possible, Checks by the legislative body, Power to command the military but not declare war or raise arms, Treaties made with concurrent power of the legislature, Appointment of officers with approval of the legislature, No power to convey privileges, Can prescribe no rules concerning commerce or coins, No particle of spiritual jurisdiction.

The comparison of the United States Constitutional restrictions to those of the British crown are awesome and revealing. Brilliant were the checks instilled upon the Executive branch of the United States’ government. This, of course, begs the question how have these limits prevailed today?

My curiosity is peeked by Alexander Hamilton’s statement about the President’s power of nomination being just that – a nomination – approved by the Senate – in ALL categories.

“The President is to nominate, and, WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers, judges of the Supreme Court, and in general all officers of the United States established by law, and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the Constitution.

The President’s nominations of ambassadors, public ministers, judges, and in general all officers of the United States established by law and whose appointment are not otherwise provided for by the Constitution must be held to the scrutiny and “consent of the senate.”

How does the bloating of our modern day federal government, with unapproved and unchecked “bureaucrats and czars,” fair under this Constitutional scrutiny? These are the bleeds that rupture the heart of a Republic and threaten a seizure of the people.

Thoughts to ponder.

God Bless,

Janine Turner

Tuesday, August 3rd, 2010