The Appointing Power of the Executive
From the New York Packet.
Tuesday, April 1, 1788.

Author: Alexander Hamilton

To the People of the State of New York:

THE President is “to NOMINATE, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the Constitution. But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, or in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. The President shall have power to fill up ALL VACANCIES which may happen DURING THE RECESS OF THE SENATE, by granting commissions which shall EXPIRE at the end of their next session.”

It has been observed in a former paper, that “the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.” If the justness of this observation be admitted, the mode of appointing the officers of the United States contained in the foregoing clauses, must, when examined, be allowed to be entitled to particular commendation. It is not easy to conceive a plan better calculated than this to promote a judicious choice of men for filling the offices of the Union; and it will not need proof, that on this point must essentially depend the character of its administration.

It will be agreed on all hands, that the power of appointment, in ordinary cases, ought to be modified in one of three ways. It ought either to be vested in a single man, or in a SELECT assembly of a moderate number; or in a single man, with the concurrence of such an assembly. The exercise of it by the people at large will be readily admitted to be impracticable; as waiving every other consideration, it would leave them little time to do anything else. When, therefore, mention is made in the subsequent reasonings of an assembly or body of men, what is said must be understood to relate to a select body or assembly, of the description already given. The people collectively, from their number and from their dispersed situation, cannot be regulated in their movements by that systematic spirit of cabal and intrigue, which will be urged as the chief objections to reposing the power in question in a body of men.

Those who have themselves reflected upon the subject, or who have attended to the observations made in other parts of these papers, in relation to the appointment of the President, will, I presume, agree to the position, that there would always be great probability of having the place supplied by a man of abilities, at least respectable. Premising this, I proceed to lay it down as a rule, that one man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, than a body of men of equal or perhaps even of superior discernment.

The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation. He will, on this account, feel himself under stronger obligations, and more interested to investigate with care the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled, and to prefer with impartiality the persons who may have the fairest pretensions to them. He will have FEWER personal attachments to gratify, than a body of men who may each be supposed to have an equal number; and will be so much the less liable to be misled by the sentiments of friendship and of affection. A single well-directed man, by a single understanding, cannot be distracted and warped by that diversity of views, feelings, and interests, which frequently distract and warp the resolutions of a collective body. There is nothing so apt to agitate the passions of mankind as personal considerations whether they relate to ourselves or to others, who are to be the objects of our choice or preference. Hence, in every exercise of the power of appointing to offices, by an assembly of men, we must expect to see a full display of all the private and party likings and dislikes, partialities and antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who compose the assembly. The choice which may at any time happen to be made under such circumstances, will of course be the result either of a victory gained by one party over the other, or of a compromise between the parties. In either case, the intrinsic merit of the candidate will be too often out of sight. In the first, the qualifications best adapted to uniting the suffrages of the party, will be more considered than those which fit the person for the station. In the last, the coalition will commonly turn upon some interested equivalent: “Give us the man we wish for this office, and you shall have the one you wish for that.” This will be the usual condition of the bargain. And it will rarely happen that the advancement of the public service will be the primary object either of party victories or of party negotiations.

The truth of the principles here advanced seems to have been felt by the most intelligent of those who have found fault with the provision made, in this respect, by the convention. They contend that the President ought solely to have been authorized to make the appointments under the federal government. But it is easy to show, that every advantage to be expected from such an arrangement would, in substance, be derived from the power of NOMINATION, which is proposed to be conferred upon him; while several disadvantages which might attend the absolute power of appointment in the hands of that officer would be avoided. In the act of nomination, his judgment alone would be exercised; and as it would be his sole duty to point out the man who, with the approbation of the Senate, should fill an office, his responsibility would be as complete as if he were to make the final appointment. There can, in this view, be no difference between nominating and appointing. The same motives which would influence a proper discharge of his duty in one case, would exist in the other. And as no man could be appointed but on his previous nomination, every man who might be appointed would be, in fact, his choice.

But might not his nomination be overruled? I grant it might, yet this could only be to make place for another nomination by himself. The person ultimately appointed must be the object of his preference, though perhaps not in the first degree. It is also not very probable that his nomination would often be overruled. The Senate could not be tempted, by the preference they might feel to another, to reject the one proposed; because they could not assure themselves, that the person they might wish would be brought forward by a second or by any subsequent nomination. They could not even be certain, that a future nomination would present a candidate in any degree more acceptable to them; and as their dissent might cast a kind of stigma upon the individual rejected, and might have the appearance of a reflection upon the judgment of the chief magistrate, it is not likely that their sanction would often be refused, where there were not special and strong reasons for the refusal.

To what purpose then require the co-operation of the Senate? I answer, that the necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful, though, in general, a silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity. In addition to this, it would be an efficacious source of stability in the administration.

It will readily be comprehended, that a man who had himself the sole disposition of offices, would be governed much more by his private inclinations and interests, than when he was bound to submit the propriety of his choice to the discussion and determination of a different and independent body, and that body an entire branch of the legislature. The possibility of rejection would be a strong motive to care in proposing. The danger to his own reputation, and, in the case of an elective magistrate, to his political existence, from betraying a spirit of favoritism, or an unbecoming pursuit of popularity, to the observation of a body whose opinion would have great weight in forming that of the public, could not fail to operate as a barrier to the one and to the other. He would be both ashamed and afraid to bring forward, for the most distinguished or lucrative stations, candidates who had no other merit than that of coming from the same State to which he particularly belonged, or of being in some way or other personally allied to him, or of possessing the necessary insignificance and pliancy to render them the obsequious instruments of his pleasure.

To this reasoning it has been objected that the President, by the influence of the power of nomination, may secure the complaisance of the Senate to his views. This supposition of universal venality in human nature is little less an error in political reasoning, than the supposition of universal rectitude. The institution of delegated power implies, that there is a portion of virtue and honor among mankind, which may be a reasonable foundation of confidence; and experience justifies the theory. It has been found to exist in the most corrupt periods of the most corrupt governments. The venality of the British House of Commons has been long a topic of accusation against that body, in the country to which they belong as well as in this; and it cannot be doubted that the charge is, to a considerable extent, well founded. But it is as little to be doubted, that there is always a large proportion of the body, which consists of independent and public-spirited men, who have an influential weight in the councils of the nation. Hence it is (the present reign not excepted) that the sense of that body is often seen to control the inclinations of the monarch, both with regard to men and to measures. Though it might therefore be allowable to suppose that the Executive might occasionally influence some individuals in the Senate, yet the supposition, that he could in general purchase the integrity of the whole body, would be forced and improbable. A man disposed to view human nature as it is, without either flattering its virtues or exaggerating its vices, will see sufficient ground of confidence in the probity of the Senate, to rest satisfied, not only that it will be impracticable to the Executive to corrupt or seduce a majority of its members, but that the necessity of its co-operation, in the business of appointments, will be a considerable and salutary restraint upon the conduct of that magistrate. Nor is the integrity of the Senate the only reliance. The Constitution has provided some important guards against the danger of executive influence upon the legislative body: it declares that “No senator or representative shall during the time FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED, be appointed to any civil office under the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such time; and no person, holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office.”

PUBLIUS.

Howdy from Arizona! We just pulled into a bus stop to get gas and our Constituting America RV Bus caught a lot of people’s attention! They love the Constitution in Arizona.

Federalist Paper No. 76 enthralls me. Once again the relevancy is amazing! Who says the Constitution is not relevant today or the Federalist Papers are antiquated?

I dare say, they have not read them or they would never dream of uttering such words!

In relation to the appointment of officers the wisdom of Alexander Hamilton is timely.

“Hence, in every exercise of the power of appointing to offices, by an assembly of men, we must expect to see a full display of all the private and party likings and dislikes, partialities and antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who compose the assembly. The choice which may at any time happen to be made under such circumstances, will of course be the result either of a victory gained by one party over the other, or of a compromise between the parties.”

Relevant? I say, yes! The following phrase is fascinating.

“In either case, the intrinsic merit of the candidate will be too often out of sight. In the first, the qualifications best adapted to uniting the suffrages of the party, will be more considered than those which fit the person for the station.”

Alexander Hamilton’s political savvy is revealed in the following phrase.

“In the last, the coalition will commonly turn upon some interested equivalent: “Give us the man we wish for this office, and you shall have the one you wish for that.” This will be the usual condition of the bargain.”

This phrase of Alexander Hamilton is revealing and relevant.

“And it will rarely happen that the advancement of the public service will be the primary object either of party victories or of party negotiations.”

Rare are the men who put country before self-interests.

God Bless,

Janine Turner
Sunday, August 15th, 2010

 

Federalist No. 76 examines the appointing power of the Executive Branch.  One of our blog commenters, Jimmy Green, summed up this paper well today:

“To keep the Executive somewhat honest the legislative branch must consent on appointments.”

This same subject was discussed in Federalist 66, in the context of powers of the Senate:

“It will be the office of the President to NOMINATE, and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to APPOINT. There will, of course, be no exertion of CHOICE on the part of the Senate. They may defeat one choice of the Executive, and oblige him to make another; but they cannot themselves CHOOSE, they can only ratify or reject the choice of the President. They might even entertain a preference to some other person, at the very moment they were assenting to the one proposed, because there might be no positive ground of opposition to him; and they could not be sure, if they withheld their assent, that the subsequent nomination would fall upon their own favorite, or upon any other person in their estimation more meritorious than the one rejected. Thus it could hardly happen, that the majority of the Senate would feel any other complacency towards the object of an appointment than such as the appearances of merit might inspire, and the proofs of the want of it destroy.”

Publius is saying that the Senate’s role in the Presidential appointment process is to decide if the President’s nominee is fit for the position nominated, on a merit basis, i.e. is the person qualified to serve in the position for which he or she is nominated?

How is this relevant today? With our newest Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan’s confirmation in the news, it’s easy to answer that question!

Historically, there have been two views regarding the role of the Senate in the Presidential nomination process of Supreme Court Justices. The two quotes below are excellent examples of each view:

Senator Orrin Hatch stated in 1993:

“If a nominee is experienced in the law, highly intelligent, of good character and temperament, and — most important — gives clear and convincing evidence that he or she understands and respects the proper role of the judiciary in our system of government, the mere fact that I might have selected a different nominee will not lead me to oppose the President’s nominee.”

 

Senator Barak Obama stated in 2006:

“There’s been a lot of discussion in the country about how the Senate should approach the confirmation process. There’s some who believe that the President, having won the election, should have complete authority to appoint the nominee, and that the Senate should only examine whether or not the Justice is intellectually capable and is nice to his wife, or she is nice to her husband. That, once you get beyond issues of intellect and personal character, then there shouldn’t be further question as to whether the Judge should be confirmed. I disagree with the view.  I believe that the Constitution calls for the Senate to advise and consent, that, meaningful advice and consent includes an examination of a judge’s philosophy, ideology, and record.”

Which of the above views have prevailed over the past few years? Examining the partisan breakdown of recent Supreme Court nominations provides at least a partial answer to that question.

President Clinton’s Supreme Court nominee, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, was confirmed in 1993 by a vote of 96-3, supported by 41 of 44 Senate Republicans, 93%.

President Clinton’s Supreme Court nominee, Stephen Breyer, was confirmed in 1994 by a vote of 87-9, supported by 33 of 42 Senate Republicans, 78%.

President Bush’s Supreme Court nominee, John Roberts, was confirmed in 2005 by a vote of 78-22, supported by 22 out of 44 Democrats, 50%.

President Bush’s Supreme Court nominee, Samuel Alito, was confirmed in 2006 by a vote or 58-42, supported by 4 out of 44 Democrats, 9%.  One Senate Republican voted against Alito.

Were Justice Roberts and Justice Alito less qualified than Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsberg, or was an ideological standard applied by the Senators who chose to vote against Justice Roberts’ and Alito’s nominations?

President Obama’s Supreme Court nominee, Sonia Sotomayor, was confirmed in 2009 by a vote of 68-31, supported by 9 out of 40 Republicans, 22%.

Last week President Obama’s Supreme Court nominee, Elena Kagain, was confirmed by a vote of 63-37, supported by 5 out of 41 Republicans, 12%.  One Democrat voted against Kagan.

This Senate.gov weblink: http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm provides an interesting look at our country’s history of Supreme Court nominations.  Scrolling through these votes, a more partisan voting trend has emerged in very recent years.  While Judge Bork was an anomaly, three Justices in the Reagan years were confirmed unanimously: Scalia, O’Connor and Kennedy, with Kennedy being the last Justice to be confirmed unanimously, in 1987.  The attitude of the Senate regarding their role in the appointments process seems to have shifted into partisanship over the last 20+years.

What is the Senate’s proper role in the Presidential Appointment process?

Publius answers that question this way:

“To what purpose then require the co-operation of the Senate? I answer, that the necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful, though, in general, a silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity. In addition to this, it would be an efficacious source of stability in the administration.”

Partisanship in the nomination process is difficult to dial back once allowed to seep in.  Is it in our Nation’s best interest for the Senate to adopt the attitude articulated by Senator Hatch in 1993 or the views articulated by President Obama in 2006?

I believe the founders intended the Senate to advise and consent based on their assessment of a nominee’s qualifications more than ideology. However, unless both parties can show evidence of dropping the partisan, ideological criteria for evaluating the President’s nominees – any President’s nominees – it is certainly not in the interest of one party to evaluate nominees based on qualifications while the other party uses an ideological measuring stick.

“We the people,” must educate ourselves regarding our founders’ intentions, formulate our opinion, and make our voice heard through our vote.   As Janine Turner, my good friend and Constituting America founder and co-chair likes to say, “Your vote is your voice.” Use it!

Good night and God Bless,

Cathy Gillespie
Wednesday, August 11th, 2010

 

Guest Essayist: Gary McCaleb, Senior Counsel with the Alliance Defense Fund

As a constitutional attorney asked to chat a bit about Federalist No. 76, I certainly did not expect to use knowledge gained as a U.S. Navy sailor in the 1970s from a book published in 1890 about history from the 1660s to help me explain a constitutional commentary drafted in 1788—but I will.

Federalist No. 76 recognizes that every government needs a stable of civil servants, who in turn must be secured for service with reasonable dispatch and with some assurance of quality.  The paper plays off a consistent theme of our founding era—to balance each grant of authority (and concomitant power) with some restraint on the authority.

In a nutshell, Hamilton takes the familiar balancing of powers among the executive, judicial, and legislative branches down a notch as he considers how to expeditiously staff the government with high quality persons, while restraining the appointment power lest it be used by the President to untoward ends.

Hamilton broadly considers the benefits and risks of vesting the appointment power in a single person; or in a larger group of representatives, or in some mix of the two.  The idea of a purely democratic appointment system he rejected out of hand—the distances and slow communications of the time precluded that option.  And while there is great efficiency in granting one person the power to appoint, that vests too great a power to shape the government in the image of one man.

The Constitution, Hamilton notes, splits the difference—the President has complete discretion to nominate, subject only to the “advice and consent” of the Senate.  This secures the efficiency of centralizing these key selections, while providing a modicum of restraint via the Senate’s review.

As Hamilton predicted—and subsequent practice confirms—the Senate seldom shoots down a Presidential nominee, for many reasons:  Most nominations are simply uncontroversial, so review is superfluous.  And often, nominees intended to advance an agenda don’t always do so once in office; uncertainty about future performance complicates the review.  Worse, for the controversial nominations, the Senate cannot be sure that refusing consent won’t lead to an even less palatable nominee the next time around.

Thus, Hamilton must answer the question:  “To what purpose then require the co-operation of the Senate?”  His answer:  “[T]hat the necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful, though, in general, a silent operation.”  In short, Hamilton sees the potential for Senatorial brouhaha, or even denial of consent, as a political risk that by its very presence tempers the discretion of the Chief Executive.

What Hamilton propounds in political terms sounds like a peaceful application of classic concept of naval warfare—an idea called the “fleet in being.”

That concept was popularized in a seminal work on global military strategy, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, published in 1890.  In assessing how sea power impacted the matters of man, Mahan found that political and military decisions could be profoundly impacted by the mere presence of a small but competent naval force.

The classic example arose in World War I, when the small German High Sea Fleet did little but sit in port—yet the constant threat that it may sally forth and salvo forced the British to commit significant combat resources to contain the German fleet in its harbor.  As warfare modernized and combined arms became the norm, the “fleet in being” was renamed “force in being,” and the principle applied more widely.

Thus, the mere fact that the Senate must review the nominations serves as some check to the President’s fearsomely strong nomination power—even if the votes against the President “never leave port,” so to speak.

Senate review means that with each nomination that proves dubious, contentious, or both, the President must spend his political capital.  When the highest profile nominations come, he must weigh the risk of pushing his agenda with the risk of having his ambitions die in the fire of a dissenting Senate, or expending the last of his capital in the fight.  Given the politicization and profile of the most important nominations (so much so that a new verb—“borking”—came into the American lexicon), the wise President will pull back from fringe politics.

The balance is imperfect, but that was likely intentional—to grant greater review power would have frustrated every administration’s efforts to staff the government.  While this undoubtedly permits a degree of undue partisanship in the process, the ultimate impact is mitigated by the higher level separation of powers.  In sum, the system performed very much as predicted, which affirms the wisdom of our Founders in drafting the Constitution.

Wednesday, August 11th, 2010